University of Dayton

eCommons
School of Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

1-16-2009

Cyberthreats: The Emerging Fault Lines of the Nation State
Susan W. Brenner
University of Dayton, susanwbrenner@yahoo.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/law_fac_pub
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons

eCommons Citation
Brenner, Susan W., "Cyberthreats: The Emerging Fault Lines of the Nation State" (2009). School of Law
Faculty Publications. 110.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/law_fac_pub/110

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in School of Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more
information, please contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

W,

ONE

Introduction

[An] invasion Jorce .. . oj digital signals marched across the border into
Estonia .... 1
ON APRIL 26. 2007. WHAT would become a two-week series of sustained digital attacks began on various components of Estonia's infrastructure. 2 The
attacks all took the form of what is known as a Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack.
In aDDoS attack. attackers overwhelm websites and servers by bombarding them with data. or "traffic:' The attackers use a network of compromised
computers-known as "zombies"-to send massive bursts of data at the targets of the attack. The zombies are computers that have been captured by
"bots" -software that subtly and usually invisibly infil trates an individual's or
a business' computer or one used by a governmental. educational. or other
agency.:\ The owners of computers recruited into bot networks. or "botnets;
usually have no idea their equipment is moonlighting as a minion of some
more-or-less sinister force. 4
Because bot programs give attackers remote control of compromised
computers. zombies can be anywhere. As we will see. geography is irrelevant

1 Robin Bloor. Large-scale DOS Attack Menace Continues to Grow. The Register (June 11.2007).
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/06/1I1dos_security_ cyberwarfare/.
2 See Mark Lander & John Markoff. Digital Fears Emerge after Data Siege in Estonia. New York
Times (May ~9. 2007). htt:p:llwww.nytimes.com/2oo7/05/29/technology/2gestonia.html?
ex=1182484800&en=ac3eadbe88fdb21c&ei=5070.
3 See Nicholas Ianelli & Aaron Hackworth. Botnets as a Vehicle for Online Crime.
CERT Coordination Center (December 1. 2005). http://www.cert.orgiarchive/pdf/Botnets.pclf.
For a good overview ofDDoS attacks and botnets. see MacAfee North America Criminology
Report: Organized Crime a nd the Internet 2007. http://www.mcafee.com/uslIocaI30ntent/m isc/na_crim inologYjeport_07.pdf.
4 See. e.g .. Brian Krebs. Bringing Botnets auto/the Shadows. Washington Post (March 21. 2006).
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dy nl co n I.e n tl article 12006/031211 AR20060321
00279.htm1.
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in cyberspace. So is size: Bot software is currently being used to assemble
enormous transnational networks of slave computers. Botnets have grown
almost exponential ly since they appeared a little more than a decade ago.s
Early botnets averaged a few hundred computers, but by 2005, the average
had risen to 1.000.6 In 2006, experts reported that the average botnet
consi sted of 20,000 zombies, with the median size being 45,000 computers;
they noted, however, that they had also tracked at least a dozen botnets
encompassing more than 100,000 slave computers.7
In the Eston ian attacks, an estimated 1 million zombie computers were
used. If true, it is far from unprecedented; Dutch authorities reported ly
encountered a 1.5 million botnet a few years ago. s And the size only continues to increase; some foresee "super botnets" comprising millions of slave
computers, while others say they are already here.9 In January 2007, one
expert called botnets a "pandemic:' estimating that 25% of the world's
networked computers-lSO million computers-could be zombies.1O
Changes have been made in how botnets are structured. One innovation is
"tiered" command and control, in whjch these functions are distributed across
many ru[ferent, geograprucal ly dispersed computer servers. A tiered botnet
operates more like a modern army-with distinct, distributed bot units and
command structures-than like the earlier versions, which had a single point of
com mand.11 And as with an army, the botnet's rustributed command structure

5 See Peer-to-Peer Bolnets a new and Growing Threat, CSO (April 17, 2007), http://www2.
csoonline . com/blo~view.html?CID=32852; Alexander Gostev, Malware Evolution:
January-March 2005, Viruslist.com (April 18, 2005), http://www.viruslist.com/en/analysis?
pubid=162454316#botnets.
6 See Robert Vamosi, What GoodAre 1,OOORemot"e-Controlied PCs?, CNET News (November
24, 2005), http://www.cnet.com.au/software/security/0.239029558.240058520.00.htm.
7 See The Botnet Trackers, Washington Post (February 16, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/16/ AR2006021601388.html .
8 See Lander & Markoff, Digital Fears Emerge after Data Siege in. Estonia, supra. See also
Gregg Keizer, Dutch Botnet Suspects Ran l.5 Million Machines, Tech Web (October 21, 2005).
http://www.techweb.com/wire/ security /172303160.

9 See Ryan Vogt & John Aycock. Attack of the 50 Foot Botnet. Technical Heport 2006-846-39.
Deparl.mentofComputer Science, University of Calgary (August 2006). http://pages.cpsc.ucalgary.ca/ Naycock/papers/50foot.pdf. See also Bot Counts, Shadow Server. http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php?n=Stats.BotCounts (yearly botnet size for April-June 2007
ranged between 2.5 and 3 million zombies).
10 See Tim Weber, Crimin.als 'May Overwhelm the Web;' BBC News (January 25. 2007),
http:// news. bbc.co.uk/2/h ilbusiness/6298641.stm.
11 See Scott Berinato, Attack of the Bots, Wired (November 2006). http://www.wired.com/
wired/archive/14.11/botneL.htmJ?pg=3&topic=botnet&top ic_set=.
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makes it more resilient to attacks from its opponents. The most recent innovation
is using peer-to-peer technology to replace centralized command and control
structures with a nonhierarchical. purely distributed system; this means the
botnet is not vulnerable to attacks on central control nodes. so the only way to
shut it down is to neutralize each of its zombies. '2
1be increasing size and dispersed co mmand structure of botnets make it
very difficult for law enforcement officers to find and nullify these armies of
slave computers and their masters.13 BotneLs have evolved into massive.
amorphous. moving targets that exist transiently in the unbounded regions of
cyberspace. as the targets of the Estonian attacks learn ed to their frustration.
TIle first tentative intrusions began on April 26. 2007. and increased thereafter; by April 29. a flood of data shut down the Estonian Parliament's email
server.l~ In an apparently related in cident on the same day. intrud ers hacked
the Reform Party's website and posted a fake political message on it. At that
point. the director of Estonias Computer Emergency Hesponse Team
(E-CERT) assembled security experts from the country's Internet service
providers. banks. government agencies. and police forces; he also reached
out to government agencies in other countries for assistan ce in tracking a nd
blocking sources of the attack.
By the end of that first week. the Estonian security forces were having
some success in frustrating the attack. but they knew the worst was to come.
The attacks seemed to emanate from Russia. and May 9 was an important
Russian holid ay, the anniversary of its defeating Nazi Germany and the day
on which the country honors its fallen soldiers. As I explain below, the
Estonian defenders knew their attackers intended to shut down the country's computer network and tri ed to prepare for the worst. TIle E-CEHT director urged the members of his security team to try to keep their sites and
services operating; he was under orders to keep an important government
site on lin e, but he was told that other government sites. including the
Estonian president's website. could be sacrificed. if necessary.
On May 9, data traffic to Estonian servers increased to thousands of tim es
its normal flow; a representative of Estonia's Defense Ministry reported that

12 See Matt I-lines, Experts: Bo/nets Add Fault Tolerance, InfoWorld (June 7, 2007),
http://\V\V\v.infoworld.com/article/07 /06/07 /Botnets-get-fault-tolerant_1.lltml.
l3 See Berinato. Attack of the Bots. supra.
14 See Lander & Markoff. Digital Fears Emerge afler Dala Siege in Estonia, supra. The information in the rest of this paragraph and in much of the next paragraph is taken from Lhis
same source.
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sites that usually received 1,000 hits a day were being bombarded with 2,000
hits a second. IS The traffic increased still further on May 10, shutting down
Estonia's largest bank. The May attacks also shut down the president's site
and other government sites and then shifted to civilian targets: newspapers,
television stations, phone systems, schools, and businesses and other financial institutions. '6 To maintain at least some internal Internet service,
Estonian authorities had to block most access to Estonian sites by people
outside the country; this meant, among other things, that Estonians traveling
abroad could not access their emai l, bank accounts, or other resources.
The DDoS attacks began to wane on May 10, but would con tinue sporadically for weeks. Estonia's largest bank, which lost at least $1 million in the
attacks, was still dealing with intermittent assaults three weeks after the
attacks began to subside on May 10. Other victims had similar experiences.' 7
The last major wave of after attacks finally ended on May 18.
Security experts in Estonia and abroad agreed that the country's defenders had done an excell ent job of dealing with the attacks. Indeed, some said
few countries could have defended themselves as skillfuJly. The attacks were,
though, still devastating in many ways for a "wired" country that likes to call
itselfE-stonia. ' 8 They revealed how very vulnerable even sophisticated computer systems can be to DDoS attacks; Estonia's defenders were able to react
as effectively as they did only because of their unusually sophisticated expertise and because their attackers reckJessly put their plans for the attacks
online.
At the beginning, as they began to hear rumors about the upcoming
attacks, Estonian security experts found detailed plans for the attacks posted
in RUSSian-language forums and chat groupS.19 Those who would become
their country's first lin e of defense in the May cyber assauJts watched the

15 See Steven Lee Myers. Estonia Computers Blitzed, Possibly by the Russians. New York
Times (May 19. 2007). http://www.nytimes.com/2oo7/05/19/world/europe/19russia.html?
ex= 133722 7200& en =4817 e43658c91382& ei=5088.
16 See Lander & Markoff. Digital Fears Emerge after Data Siege in Eston ia. supra; Myers,
Esto ni a Computers Blitzed. Possibly by the Russians, supra.
17 See Tony Halpin, EstoniaAccuses Russia oJ· Waging Cyber War,"Times Online (May 17. 2007).
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/articleI802959.ece.
18 See Myers. Estonia Computers Blitzed, supra. At the time of the attacks. in Estonia you
cou ld "pay for your parking meter via cell phone, access free Wi-Fi at every gas station.
and ... vote in national elections from yo ur Pc." Cyrus Farivar. Cyberwar 1: What the
Attacks on Estonia Have Taught Us about Online Combat, Slate (May 22, 2007). http://www.
slate.com/id/2166749/.
19 See Lander & Markoff: Digital Fears Emerge after Data Siege in Estonia, supra.
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attacks being orchestrated on line in real-tim e, which gave them a n obvious
advantage when it came time to respond.
Afterward, Estonian authorities blamed Russia for the attacks, which they
referred to as "cyberwarfare:'2o The Eston ians based that allegation on several
factors, one of which was that the attacks see med to have been launched in
retaliation for the governm en t's removing a statue of a World War II Soviet
solider from a park in Tallinn not long before the attacks began and not long
before the May 9 holid ay. (Officials had expected the re moval to trigger street
protests from the country's Russian-speaking minority.) Estonian au thorities
also noted that Russian-language sites were used to plan the attacks and
claimed that a member of the Russian security service was "one of the masterminds" of the attacks. 2 1 Finally, the Estonian authorities claimed that
security experts a nalyzing th e DDoS attacks allegedly traced Intern et
addresses used in the attacks to Ru ssian government agencies, including the
office of President Vlad imi r Putin.n
The Eston ians also relied on an inferential circu mstan ce in condemning
Russia for the attacks. The inferential circumstance was the premise that the
attacks were of such magnitude that mere civilians could not have carried
them out; according to thi s th eory, only a state could have been responsible for
the attacks. 23 TIle Russian govern ment vehemently denied any .involvement in
them, a denial many outside Estonia found credible. Some foreign experts said
it might be impossible ever to ascertain precisely who was responsible for the
attacks. As one put it, "'The Internet is perfect for plausible deni ability: "2'1
As time passed, even the Estonian authorities abandoned the idea that the
attacks were Russian cyberwarfare.2:' By June, Estonia's prime minister was
describing them as '''criminal activity'" and asking the Russi an govern ment

20 See Halpin, EstoniaAccuses Russia oj"Waging Cyber War,"supra (Eston ia's Foreign Ivli nister
"acc used the Kremli n" of being directly involved in the attacks).

21 See Ian Traynor. Russia Accused oj Unleashing Cyben var to Disable Esl.onia. Gua rdian
Unlimited (May 17. 2007). http://www.gua rcii an.co.uk/russia/article/0.. 2081438.00.html.
Other experts "were divided" as to whet.h er it was possible to icl entify those involved in
the attacks. See id.
22 See Lancler & Ma rkoff. Digital Fears Emerge after Data Siege in Esto ni a. supra..

23 See Traynor. Ru ssia Accused of Unleashi ng Cyberwar to Disable Eston ia. su.pra..
24 Lander & Markoff. Digil.al Fears Emerge afler Dala Siege in Estonia. supra (quoting Gadi
Evro n. Israeli computer security expe rt who investigated the attacks).

25 See John Schwartz. When Computers AUack, New York Tim es (june 24. 2007). hltp://www.
nytimes. c om/2007 /06/24/ we eki n rev iew /24sc hwa rt z. h tm l?ex= J 183694400&
e n=bb2b9a4cl a7bfc84&ei=5070.
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for assistance in finding those responsible.26 And the international community had come to the sobering realization that the Estonian attacks were not.
after all. something beyond the capacity of mere civilians. The technology
and techniques used in the attacks were not new. and they did not involve
tactics that only a nation-state would be able to impl ementP
The Estonian attacks are instructive for our purposes not merely because
they illustrate the kind of evils that are emerging from the dark side of cyberspace. More important for this discussion. they demonstrate how evolving
threats emerging from cyberspace challenge the conceptual categories we
have so far used to avoid chaos and main tain order in our societies and in our
lives. What was never ambiguous was that the country ofEstonia was attacked.
repeatedly and maliciously. What was. and remains. ambiguous is what kind
of attack it was. and who was responsible. The two issues-the nature of the
attack and the identity of the attackers-are actually interrelated.
To understand why. let us consider the possibilities. The first set of possibilities goes to the nature of the attack and encompasses three alternatives:
cyberwarfare. cyberterrorism. or cybercrime. We will parse these three
alternatives in detail in the next chapter. so here I will simply note the basic
distinctions among them.
Cyberwarfare. like its real-world28 counterpart. consists of a military conflict between two nation-states. At a minimum. therefore. for the attacks to
constitute cyberwarfare. they would have to have been launched by another
country. such as Russia. which ultimately proved to be blameless. No evidence
ever pointed to any other country's being responsible for the attacks.

26 Estonia Asks For Russia Help to Find Web Criminals. Relfters (June 6. 2007). hup:/ /www.
javno.com/en/world/clanak.php?id=50606. A few weeks after the attacks ended. some
non-Esto nian expe rts concluded they had been launched by globally coordinated political
activists. See Michelle Price. Political Activists Blamed for Russian Cyber Assaults.
Information Age (june 4. 2007). http://www.information-age.co m/infologlia_today/2007 /
06/political_activists_blamed_for.html.
27 See Schwartz. When Computers Attack. supra.

28 In this and succeed ing chapters. I use the term "real-world" to denote the default realit)'
we inhabit, i.e .• the reality that is not cyberspace. In call ing it the "real-world; J am not
implying that what goes on in cyberspace is not "real; either in terms of our immed iate
experience of it or in terms of the consequences activity in cyberspace may have for our
external environment. I use the term "real-wo rld" to denote th e physica l. tangible environm ent in which we spe nd the better part of our lives. Here. "real" has the essential ly the
same connotation it has when coupled with "property"; in the law. "real property" is
understood as being something tangible and physical. as opposed to intangible commodities such as rights. See. e.g .• "Abatement and Hevival" § 150. Corpus Juris Secundum
(Thomson West 2007).
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Cybercrime. like its real-world counterpart. consists of private citizens'
intentionally engaging in activi ty that threatens a societ-y's ability to maintain internal order. Therefore. for the attacks to constitute cybercrime. they
would have to have been launched by individuals who were pursuing typical
criminal goals. such as enri ching themselves through theft or extortion.
There was never. however. any evidence that the attacks were undertaken for
the purpose of theft. extortion. or any of the motives typical of mere criminals. The attackers seemed bent on destruction for destruction's sake. and
that brings us to the third and final possibility.
Cyberterrorism. like its real-world cou nterpart. consists of private citizens'
engaging in terrorist activity. Emp iri cally. terrorism is often indi stinguishable
from crimi nal activity because. like criminals. terrorists cause death and injury
to people and damage to property; the distinction between the two consequently li es not in the cond uct involved or the resul t achieved but in the motivations for the conduct and for its result. Terrorists act to promote ideological
principles. not to enrich or otherwise benefit themselves as individuals.
Therefore. for the Estoruan attacks to constitute cyberterrorism. individuals
who sought to promote ideological principles would have lau nched them. in
this instance by shutting down various websites and generally crippling the
cou ntry's Internet access. The fact that the attacks apparently sought destruction and disruption for their own sake inferen tially supports the conclusion
they were cyberterrorism . but terrorists usually take responsibility for their
actions. That. after all . is the point: Terrorism-including. presumably. cyberterrorism-is havoc for political reasons. Unless the political motives for a
terrorist attack are acknowledged and publicized. the attack has no purpose.
And no one ever attributed political motivations to the Estoni an attacks.
Where does this leave us? It leaves us with the new reality of a wired
world. Estoni a will never know who was responsible for the attacks or why
they were launched. something that is not possible in the unwired. physical
world. In the physical world. when a country is at war. it knows it is at war
and. most likely. with whom. So when the Germ an army invaded Poland in
1939. Poland knew it was at war wiLh Germany; and when the Japanese air
force bombed Pearl Harbor in 1941. the United States knew it was at war
with]apan.
Activity in the physical world is visible and therefore transparent. The
immed iate visibility of armi es invading and planes bombing translates into
war. the responsibility for which is usually also apparent. Murder. theft. rape.
an d all the other crim es we have t radition ally encountered generally reveal
themselves as what they are upon commission, though their authorship may
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remain obscure, at least for a time. The same is true for terrorism: When two
planes flew into the World Trade Center, it was immediately apparent this
was terrorism, not war, not crime, and not accid ent. Nation-states do not use
commercial airliners to wage war, and criminals do not engage in destruction for the sake of destruction. Once the nature of the attack was clear, the
focus shifted to identifying those responsible through a combination ofinference and crediting the eventual claims of responsibility.
None of this is true for conduct vectored through cyberspace. In the next
few chapters, we will explore in detail why and how cyberspace erodes, and
eliminates, our ability to identify the nature of an attack and/or the identity of
those responsible. The Estonian episode was far from an isolated event; other
countries, including the United States, have been the objects of similar, though
rather more targeted, attacks. In each instance, as we shall see, the nature of
the attack remained ambiguous and the identity of those responsible was
never ascertainable.
This undeniable reality is a matter of great import for all of us-for private
citizens and governments alike-because it undermines the conceptual,
legal, and practical strategies we rely on to defeat chaos and maintain order
within and among our societies. We have never been able to eliminate chaos
in the real, physical world, but we have learned how to keep it under enough
control that it does not threaten the fabric of our lives.
Cyberspace changes that. The problem we confront is that the tactics we
use to control chaos in the real, physical world are generally ineffective when it
comes to the cyberworld. If the chaos evolving in the cyberworld stayed in that
virtual environment, we would have little or no reason to be concerned; we
could simply quarantine cyberspace and isolate the problem. Unfortunately,
what happens in the cyberworld does not stay in the cyberworld; it migrates
out into our world because cyberspace is not a true external ity. It is simply a
vector for human activity, both good and bad. Cyberspace lets the worst of
everyplace leak out into anyplace, and that is part of our problem.
As we shall see, the concepts and strategies we use to maintain order in
the physical world are all based on the concept of "place;' of geographical
territory. Our notions of security are enclave notions; we control chaos by
limiting its ability to manifest itselfin a particular area. Our world is made up
of a patchwork of enclaves in which chaos is being controlled more or less
successfully. We have complicated rules and strategies for control li ng chaos
with in and among these enclaves. And, as we shall see, all of those rules and
strategies, even the ones designed to control chaos among enclaves, are
based on this notion of sovereign spaces.

INTRODUCTION

Cyberspace presents us with what is, in essence, a fourth (or maybe fifth)
dimension-a behavioral dimension rather than a spatial dimension.
Cyberspace is not "real" in any tangible sense, but as we saw with the Estonian
attacks, it can have very real effects in the spatial world we inhabit. But
because cyberspace is neither a "real" place nor is situated in a "real:' tangible
space, it is not subject to the terrestrial rules and strategies we use to control
chaos with in and among our physical enclaves.
The individuals whose conduct manifests itself through cyberspace are, of
course, located in a terrestrial enclave, which can mean they are subject to
these rules and strategies. Unfortunately, as we saw with the Estonian attacks,
this is not inevitable: Ifwe cannot identify those responsible for chaos emanatir.g from cyberspace, we cannot subject them to the terrestrial rules and
strategies we use to discourage this type of activity. And as we shall see, even
if we can identify the perpetrators they may still be beyond the reach of these
measures; they may, for example, be operating from Country A, which
discourages internal chaos but has no problem with allowing its residents to
prey on those residing in Countries C-Z.
In the next several chapters, I explain in detail precisely why the terrestrial rules and strategies are not effective for conduct vectored through
cyberspace. The problem, essentially, is that they assume visible, identifiable
activity. So, if we identify activity as war, we use our war rules and strategies
to deal with it; if we identify activity as cri me, we use our crime rules and
strategies to deal with it; and the same is also true if we id entify activity as
terrorism because we currently treat terrorism as a variety of crime.z9 As I
explain in the next chapters, the way we control the incidence of chaos is to
react to outbreaks of war, crim e, and terrorism in a way that is designed to
discourage such events.
As we have seen, this system breaks down when neither the nature of the
activit)' nor the identity of those responsible is apparent. Not only do we not
know whom to target with our reactive efforts, we do not know what kind of
reaction is appropriate. The Estonian authorities believed they were engaged
in cyberwarfare with Russia, but their belief did not rise to the level of
certainty that would have warranted an oflensive counterattack with realworld weapons. Their belief was, apparen tl y, erron eous, but what if it had not
been? What if Russia had really been engaging in cyberwarfare against
Estonia? What if (hypothetically) the attacks were the first of a series of

29 'n,is assumes we are able to identify those who are responsible for the war. crime, or
terrorism, which is usuaUy true for activity in the physical world.
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cyberwarfare assaults by Russia? Uncertain wheLher it is, in fact, at war,
Estonia passively tries to fend off the never-ending, increasingly sophisticated attacks until its economy and society are so weakened they collapse,
at which point Russia kind ly offers to send troops to stabilize the situation.
That scenario may seem absurd, but it probably is not. As we will see in
later chapters, coun tries are preparing for cyberwarfare, and it appears cyberwarfare will look nothing like its real-world counterpart. Real-world warfare is
overt and destructive; cyberwarfare will be subtle and erosive. China, fo r
example, has already articul ated plans for cyberwarfare that involve using
civili ans and civilian en tities in attacking foreign corporate and fi nancial instituti ons. In the real, physical world, warfare is like p rofessional football: only
the deSignated players participate. In th e cyberworld, warfare will be much
more catholic; civilians are likely to be prime players and prime targets.
That creates at least the potential for confl ating war, crime, and terrorism.
As we all know, crime and terrorism are civil-civilian on civilian affairs-while
war is the exclusive p rovince of the mili tary. Armies, which are otten composed
of erstwhile civilians, fight wars; "pure" civilians do not. Civilians are, of course,
caught up in warfare, but we have developed an elaborate set of rules for how
"noncombatants" are to be treated; and we refer to unavoidable harms to civilians as "collateral damage" because it is a byproduct of the purely military
effort.
In cyberwarfare, it seems, there may be no room for noncombatants. And
this brings me back to the point I made earlier: If civilians are legitim ate
targets in cyberwarfare, then how can a country tell wheth er it is dealing
with war, crim e, or terrori sm? The distinctions are of p rofound importance
in the world in which we currently live because they determin e . .. everything. 1hey determine who will respond to an attack and how they will
respond. We do not, for example, use nucl ear devices or other military weapons against bank robbers or terrorists. In th e United States, anyway, our law
bars th e military fro m participating in civilian law enforcement; we have an
absolute, un breach able partition between civil and military threat respo nse
strategies. And we, like every other functioning coun try, have a carefully calibrated hierarchy of threats and an equally carefully calibrated hierarchy of
threat responses for the real world.
Because it is becoming increas ingly apparent that these threat and
response hierarchies are not effective against cyberthreats, we must develop a
new approach for cyberthreats. We must devise p rinciples and strategies that
are effective in this new threat envi ronment. Logically, the cyberthreat strategies can either supplement our real-world threat and response hi erarchies,
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or replace them. If we decide cyberthreats are merely a new and distinct
category of threats-an analogue of cri me, war, and terror-then the approach
we devise ,"!ill be additive; that is, it will supplement the principles and strategies we employ for these traditional, real-world threats. If, on the other hand,
we decide that cyberthreats are not a distinct category of threats but are,
instead, evolvin g variations of the three traditional threat categori es, then we
will either need to upgrade our cu rrent discrete threat and response hierarch ies with new expanded versions or implement, instead, an entirely new,
holistic approach to controll ing chaos omine and online.
That is what this book is about. I am not p resumptuous enough to attempt
to resolve all of these issues here. My goal is rather to explain why they are
issues we must confront and to ofter some modest suggestions as to how we
might go about resolving them. Though that may sound unambitious, it actually is not. The law-abiding, stable societies most of us enjoy are the product
of centuri es of struggle against chaos in its various forms. Some of the methods we employ to deal with chaos are ancient; others, such as professional
policing, are relatively new. All, however, are well rooted in hi story, tradition,
and culture; we are so accustomed to having the military deal with war and a
professional police force deal with crime and terrorism that it is difficult for
us to imagine anything different. What we have seems "right"- inevitable.
And so it may be. But because what we have is clearly not enough for the
world we are beginning to co nfront, we need to think about what we can do
differently to make that world as safe as possible for us and for those who
come after us. And that is what we do here.
The next several chapters parse the real-world threat categories and the
principles and strategies we have devised to deal \vith them. They also
demonstrate why and how these principles and strategies are not effective
against cyberthreats. We then consider how societies can improve their ability to control cyberthreats without encroaching on individu alliberLies or the
constructive a narchy of cyberspace.
Before we begin , I need to clarify one point: Later, particularly Chapter 7,
J \viII analyze what I cal l "cyb3rchaos":J()-the potential disruption attributable
to new, elusive threats emerging from cyberspace. When I discuss this potential
disruption, I by no means intend to suggest that we are on the brink of a complete social and cultural meltdown. As far as I can tell, the Cyber-Vandals are
not at the gate and we are not the Roman Empire in the early fifth ce ntury AD.

30 I defi ne I:hi term more precisely in Chapter 7.
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But meltdown is not the only hazard that evolved civilizations face; contumacious, erosive threats can ultimately prove to be, if not equally devastating,
devastating enough to present cause for concern. The British Empire, after all,
never fell; it declined, to a shadow of what it had been.
In 2004, three years before I write th is, the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation
estimated that cybercrime cost U.S. citizens about $400 billion,~ 1 and in July
of 2007, FBI Director Robert Muell er said he believes only about one-th ird of
the cybercrime in the United States is actually reported to the FBI.32 I have
heard cybercrime cost estim ates that are much, much higher than Lhe figure
cited for 2004; and as everyone involved with cybercrime knows, it has dramatically increased in the last three years and will continue to increase
unless and until governments begin to create reali stic disincentives for
cybercrimin als. I also believe, based on reliable anecdotal evidence, that the
reporting rate for cybercrime in the United States, anyway, is much less than
Director Mueller estimates. As we will see, victimized businesses do not
report cybercrime to law enforce ment for many reasons, and I suspect similar forces often influence individual victim s, as well.
So, while LwenL),-first-century western civili zation is obviously not on the
brink of a Cyber-Decline and Fall, cybercrime and other threats emanating
from cyberspace are, in my op inion, a very legitimate cause for concern. The
reason I am writing this is because I believe the problem is solvable, but not
if we continue trying to use old solutions for new evils.

31 See Alice Lipowicz,Rentable Crime Networks Latest Security Threat, Washington Technology
(July 5. 2005). http://www.washingtontechnology.com/online/l_l/26546-l. html.
32 FBI Director Encourages Businesses to Report Cybercrime, Securi ty Solutions (.July 10. 2007).
http://securitysolutions.co m/ news/security _fbi_director_encourages/.

